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 The Eurasian Union: Future of  Integration 
or Failure in the Making
Maria Gershuni
Sponsored by Robert Goeckel
INTRODUCTION 
Very little is known in the West about the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU or Eurasian Union), a single 
market between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, and the Russian Federation. However, many 
in Central Asia and Eastern Europe consider it to be 
the next stage in Eurasian development and coopera-
tion. e lack of knowledge regarding the Eurasian 
Economic Union by American writers and scholars 
comes in part from the rapid and recent creation and 
evolution of the Union, and in part from the dearth 
of American geographical understanding. One of the 
more concerning issues regarding this paper was the 
lack of geographic knowledge of the EEU member 
states. is is particularly concerning since the re-
gions of Central Asia and Eastern Europe lay directly 
in the interests of rising powers such as China and 
the Russian Federation. e Eurasian Economic Un-
ion is an example of the growing importance of the 
Eurasian region as it tries to assert itself in the inter-
national political order. 
 In 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin 
announced his plans to create a large scale integra-
tion project starting in the countries that previously 
made up the Soviet space, he called it “a future be-
ing born today” (2011). Embedded into the project 
was the hope that the EEU would become one of the 
poles of a multipolar world, a partner and a balancer 
to the European Union (EU) and the United States 
(Putin, 2011). ough the EEU and the EU are nor-
mative competitors, the idea behind the EEU and 
the inspiration for its institutions came from the EU. 
Like the EU, the EEU evolved from a free trade area 
in which duties and taris between nations within 
the area were eliminated. It then became a customs 
union, setting a common external tari on imports 
from other nations. At the moment, both the EU 
and EEU are  working on eliminating all non-tari 
barriers between nations within the union, such as 
burdensome regulations and quotas. In his speech 
announcing the intention to create the EEU, Putin 
even praised the EU for their integration model, and 
specically praised the Schengen Agreement: accords 
that allowed citizens of EU nations free movement be-
tween the borders of participant states (Putin, 2011). 
He explicitly stated the desire to recreate Schengen 
to some extent within the participating countries of 
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the Eurasian Union, to allow for better movement of 
labor and capital between the nations. 
However, in the summer of 2016, the integration 
projects seemed to face an irreparable blow when, in 
an unprecedented move, the United Kingdom voted 
to leave the EU. is led many to question the vi-
ability of long term integration projects and their 
attractiveness to member states. Since the Eurasian 
Economic Union was explicitly based on the model 
of the EU and often denes itself in relation to the 
EU, questions about the future of the EEU rose as 
well. Does Brexit spell bad news for the EEU, un-
covering aws with regional integration as a whole? 
Or was Brexit benecial to the development of the 
EEU, exposing the aws in a competitor’s model and 
making the still unaligned nations of Eastern Europe 
more hesitant to pursue European Union member-
ship, as some writers claim (Walker, 2016)? Further-
more, since much of the rhetoric of the “Brexit” vote 
was centered around a fear of migrants and refugees 
taking advantage of the free movement clause of the 
EU, will fear of backlash also prevent better imple-
mentation of free movement in the Eurasian Union? 
e long term viability of the Eurasian Union, 
however, is unrelated to events going on in Britain. 
ough modeled on the European Union, vari-
ous normative dimensions of the EEU are entirely 
dierent from the EU and, occasionally, go against 
the core foundation of the EU. Not only is the idea 
of a referendum on membership foreign to the cen-
tralized, authoritarian leaning leadership of most 
EEU member states, but technical implementation 
of EEU policies has not been suciently executed 
enough to produce a backlash. Long term viability of 
the EEU depends on the ability of its institutions to 
uphold their responsibilities under EEU treaties and 
the commitment of the leaders to pursue successful 
integration, not only in name, but in function. 
e Eurasian Economic Union “stands a good 
chance of becoming an inalienable part of the new 
global architecture that is being created” (53), but 
needs to overcome signicant hurdles stemming 
from its rapid integration and focus on solidifying 
cultural boundaries of “Eurasianism,” versus creating 
longstanding norms and institutions (Podberezkin & 
Podberezkina, 2014). Using the lessons learned from 
EU integration, we examine the challenges faced 
the Eurasian Economic Union and understand the 
changes that need to be implemented for the pro-
ject to work. e unique aspects of EEU normative 
framework allow it to be an attractive option for 
countries wishing to engage in regional integration. 
But in order for the project to be sustainable, further 
deepening of integration must be paced more care-
fully, and the member states’ leaders must be com-
mitted in projecting a unied, functional agenda for 
the future of the Eurasian Union. 
EVOLUTION OF THE EEU 
e idea for a concrete Eurasian Union was born 
even before 1994, the year when the President of 
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazerbayev, suggested cre-
ating a trade bloc and alliance structure he called 
“e Eurasian Union” (Yesdauletova, & Yesdauletov, 
2012). e historical roots for creating the union 
stretch back to the Russian Empire, which existed 
from 1721 to 1917. Currently, all members of the 
EEU were once a part of the Empire or its protec-
torates, meaning they were economically subjected 
to the rulings of the central government in Moscow 
and in St. Petersburg. Some of the infrastructure that 
core EEU industries depend on was created dur-
ing the days of the Russian Empire, such as the rail 
lines stretching across Central Asia (Cheng-Hin Lim, 
2017). ese rail lines provided the linkages among 
which the economies of the peripheral areas of the 
Russian Empire were connected to the center and 
along which the modern freight industry is being or-
ganized (Cheng-Him Lin, 2017). e rising of the 
USSR, from the still-smoldering ashes of the Russian 
Empire, provided for the formation of the “Socialist 
Republics” within the USSR. ese states, includ-
ing Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan 
were also subordinate to the central government in 
Moscow within the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic 
(Shkaratam, 2015). e economies of the socialist re-
publics were integrated under a Communist system, 
but the partnerships were unequal and exploitative, 
and therefore, unattractive to attempt and recreate 
in a voluntary economic union (Shkaratam, 2015). 
Almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR, 
attempts were made to facilitate cooperation among 
the now-independent states. e Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991 
with the participation of ten Former-Soviet repub-
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lics (Yesdauletova, & Yesdauletov, 2012). e focus 
of the organization was to provide a forum to dis-
cuss social issues such as human rights, and possible 
military cooperation (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 
2012). However, implementation mechanisms of 
the CIS were relatively weak and some CIS countries 
wanted further cooperation. In 1994, CIS countries 
started negotiations on a free trade area, but negotia-
tions were only completed in 2011, when the CIS 
Free Trade Area was established by eight of the CIS 
member states (Radzievskaya, 2014). 
However, individual members of the CIS were frus-
trated at the lack of immediate progress and began to 
pursue further economic integration (Radzievskaya, 
2014). Russia and Belarus signed the Agreement on 
Establishing a Customs Union in 1995, which out-
lined their intention to work on harmonizing ex-
ternal taris. In 1996, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
signed onto the Customs Union agreement, followed 
by Tajikistan in 1998. e Eurasian Economic Com-
munity was formed in 2000, with all ve signatories 
of the Customs Agreement (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) and three observ-
er states (Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova) in order 
to functionally set up the framework for a Customs 
Union. e Eurasian Economic Community worked 
on creating a streamlined procedure for currency ex-
changes, creating a common market for key indus-
tries such as energy and transport, and worked on 
increasing cross border entrepreneurship opportuni-
ties. In 2010, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia nally 
created the Eurasian Customs Union. 
As soon as the Customs Union was created, work be-
gan on further integration (Yesdauletova & Yesdau-
letov, 2012). In 2012, a Single Economic Space was 
created between the three Customs Union member 
states which aimed to remove all physical and techni-
cal barriers to movement of labor, goods, and capital. 
Both the treaty establishing the Customs Union and 
the Single Economic Space were terminated by the 
Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union which was 
signed in 2014, and came into force on 1 January 
2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan signed in January 
and August respectively and negotiations for Tajik-
istan’s participation are underway as of 2017. Pro-
ponents of the project claim that the EEU is “viable” 
and not “declarative” like previous agreements such 
as the CIS (Radzievskaya, 2014, p. 7). Currently, the 
Union encompasses 180 million people, stretches 
over 15% of the world’s land (International Crisis 
Group, 2016). It spans 12 dierent time zones and 
is looking only to grow (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 
2012). ough Ukraine and Georgia withdrew from 
previous Eurasian cooperative agreements, in part 
because of obligations imposed by their EU Asso-
ciation Agreements, and in part because of conicts 
with the Russian Federation, the EEU is considering 
countries such as Uzbekistan, Iran, and Turkey to be 
potential collaborators in the long run (Cheng-Hin 
Lin, 2017).
Two vital conclusions can be drawn from examining 
the historical legacy and recent evolution of the Eura-
sian Union. e rst is that there is an underlying 
foundation of inequality embedded in the relation-
ship between the nations of the Union. Relations be-
tween Russia and the nations in the periphery of the 
Russian Empire and of the USSR were exploitative 
and unequal. erefore, critics both inside and out-
side the union were wary of any integration projects 
in the post-Soviet space because of the possibility of a 
resurgence of such relationships. 
Some, like former Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton, claimed that the Eurasian Union was simply an 
attempt by Russia to recreate the USSR “under the 
guise of economic integration” (Glazyev, 2015, p. 
93). However, Russia quickly rebuked those claims. 
Membership in the economic union was purely vol-
untary, and based on mutual interests. Russian Presi-
dential aide for the formation of the Customs Un-
ion between Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, Sergei 
Glazyev said that: 
“Unlike the EU or the US empires, 
which coerce other countries by force of 
arms and the power of their reserve cur-
rencies, Eurasian integration is a volun-
tary association of people who have lived 
side by side for centuries.” (2015, p. 93)
He went on to further underscore the EEU’s focus 
on individual sovereignty and mutual economic 
prosperity as the cornerstone of the EEU’s creation. 
Putin specically denied imperialistic accusations in 
his 2011 speech, saying that the EEU is not intended 
to be “fortress Eurasia” (Kazantsev, 2015, p. 215). In-
stead, the EEU is intended to be a link between Eu-
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rope and the Asia-Pacic, unied by common values 
and norms, and embracing of the liberal approach to 
integration.
 In order to internally ameliorate fears regarding 
USSR re-creation, Belarus and Kazakhstan worked 
to make “equality” one of the principles of the EEU 
(Sevim, 2013, p. 53). Specically, President Nazer-
bayev of Kazakhstan was cautious of allowing Russia 
too much inuence in the Union because Kazakh-
stan is the only EEU member to share a long border 
with Russia, and has a sizable Russian population in 
the north (Nurgaliyeva, 2016). When signing the 
agreement to join the EEU, Nazerbayev assured his 
people that this was not a return to the Soviet era 
by asserting that Kazakhstan will act as a balancer to 
Russia in the EEU and will never be submissive to 
Russia (Nurgaliyeva, 2016, p. 94). At least on paper, 
there seems to be a genuine attempt to represent the 
Union as a partnership of equals without any hint of 
Soviet-ism.
e second conclusion to be drawn from examining 
the evolution of the EEU is that post-Soviet integra-
tion has been extremely rapid. For a project that often 
compares itself to the EU, the timelines of evolution 
couldn’t be more divergent. e European Union 
began as the European Coal and Steel Community 
with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (Mc-
Cormick & Olsen, 2011).  e European Union as it 
is known today was only established in 1993 by the 
Maastricht Treaty and it wasn’t until the completion 
of the internal market in 1994, that the EU able to 
facilitate and regulate free movement of labor, goods, 
and services inside its borders. Furthermore, one of 
the core institutions of the European Union, the Eu-
ropean Council, was only established in 2000, while 
the Eurasian Union equivalent was created immedi-
ately following the formation of the Customs Union. 
e Eurasian Union integration pace is generally the 
result of a top-down process by governments who 
sought closer economic ties (Yesdaultova & Yesdaule-
tov, 2012). Because industries such as natural gas and 
transport are partially or wholly owned by the state in 
Eurasia, the interests of these industries were heavily 
considered in the decision making process to inte-
grate. Furthermore, integration occurred so rapidly 
that results from the previous stages of integration 
were impossible to measure before the next stage of 
integration was pursued. is has had a tremendous 
impact on the creation of institutions and on output. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the process behind this rapid 
integration of the Eurasian Economic Union, we can 
look to the theoretical backgrounds of integration 
projects. eories of international relations serve to 
explain the impetus behind the formation of regional 
organizations.  e theories of international relations 
that will be examined in the context of the EEU are 
neo-liberal institutionalism, the functionalist theory 
of integration, transactional theory of integration, 
and neo-realism. 
Proponents of the EEU claim that neo-liberal insti-
tutionalism serves as the foundation for the integra-
tion project, much like it did for the European Union 
project. Neo-liberal institutionalists claim that states 
overcome the anarchy inherent in the international 
system by creating governing institutions and ceding 
some sovereignty to these institutions (Keohane & 
Nye, 2012). ese institutions, in turn, create rules 
and norms which states have to obey (Keohane & 
Nye, 2012). is theory contends that mutual pros-
perity, peace, and order will result from the creation 
of these governing institutions (Keohane & Nye, 
2012, p. 163). e anarchy and instability result-
ing from the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed 
for some nations in the post-Soviet space to seek out 
order and peace through multilateral governance, 
and the creation of regimes and norms (“Introducing 
the Eurasian Economic Union,” 2014). Neo-liberal 
institutionalism is fundamental to all regional inte-
gration projects because it requires some seceding of 
sovereignty for mutual peace and prosperity. Eco-
nomic integration through multilateral institutions 
allows for greater mutual prosperity because of the 
“economies of scale” argument, the principle that 
production costs can be saved by increasing demand 
for a good and its production (Rosencrance, 2012, p. 
356).  erefore, increasing unfettered market access 
within Eurasia would be advantageous to producers 
and consumers, who would benet from lower cost 
goods. e rst few years of the project already saw 
an increase in prosperity, with trade within the Un-
ion increasing by 30% (Rosencrance, 2012, p. 356). 
erefore, some neo-liberal institutionalists might 
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say that the rules regime created by the economic in-
tegration of Eurasia has worked. 
Within liberalism, there are theories regarding the 
dierent paths that states use to integrate. In post-
World War II Europe, Robert Schuman and Jean 
Monnet believed in sectoral integration of the econo-
mies of France and Germany (Monnet, 2014). ey 
believed that integrating certain sectors of the econo-
my, in the European case, coal and steel, would lead 
to peaceful relations between nations. e European 
continent had just come out of two world wars, and 
the plan, which became known as the “Schuman 
Plan” was the foundation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (Monnet, 2014, p. 21). e Com-
munity, composed of France, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, was supposed 
to ensure stability and prosperity on the European 
continent by integrating some of their most vital in-
dustries (Monnet, 2014, p. 21). e Schuman and 
Monnet logic, though not explicit, was foundation-
ally a part of the formation of the Eurasian Union. 
e sectoral drive behind the Eurasian Union, how-
ever, was not coal and steel (Niemi, 2017). Rather it 
was natural gas and oil, the most important sector of 
Russia and the Central Asian economies. “Pipeline 
politics,” the political negotiations behind the acqui-
sition and transport of oil and natural gas reserves 
in Eurasia, drove much of the original negotiations 
behind economic integration since it was the sector 
providing most of the funding to carry out further 
projects. e nationally owned natural gas and oil 
companies, Gazprom in Russia and KazMunayGas 
in Kazakhstan, required both business and govern-
mental cooperation in order to extract natural gas 
and ship it to Europe. e Belarusian government is 
also a vital cooperator in pipeline politics, since pipe-
lines running through Belarus allow gas companies 
to export their products to Europe. e Soviet Un-
ion meant pipelines could be built and run with the 
mandatory cooperation of all Republics involved and 
with assured stability. e break-up of the Soviet Un-
ion was an event akin to the Second World War, put-
ting stability in Eurasia at risk, and therefore, Pipe-
line Politics would push for stability via economic 
cooperation.
Sectoral integration leads to the question of whether 
it was functional integration that drove the Eurasian 
project. Functional integration, and its doctrinal suc-
cessor neo-functionalism, say that integration is pur-
sued in sectors where it is most protable (Mitrany, 
2014). Integration produces needs for other sectors 
to begin integrating that are related to the rst sec-
tors, or for political policy and governance to be cre-
ated in order to better accommodate the integrated 
sectors. is eect is called “spill-over” and theorists 
like David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas claim that 
spill-over was one of the driving forces behind the 
further integration of the European Union (Haas, 
2014, p. 145).
In the Eurasian Union, one might be able to see 
functional integration in the oil and natural gas in-
dustry, spilling over into other industries such as 
transportation, shipping, and communications. e 
links that were formed between government ocials 
and business leaders, during pipeline negotiations 
made it easier for connections to be forged in other 
industries that would be beneted by closer integra-
tion. e shipping industry is a prime example of 
this. Before the formation of the Eurasian Union, 
98% of all trade between the Asia-Pacic and Europe 
went through the Suez Canal in Egypt (Lysokon, 
2012, p. 7). However, the EEU’s focus on increasing 
the speed and lowering the costs of freight trac will 
make shipping across land twice as fast and half as 
expensive (Lysokon, 2012, p. 7). erefore, freight 
trac is projected to rise by 490 million tons annu-
ally by 2020, four times the growth than in the years 
between 2000 and 2010 (Lysokon, 2012, p. 7). 
is looks like sectoral spillover from original nego-
tiations to integrate the oil and gas industry. How-
ever, it is very dicult to discern whether or not the 
Eurasian Union came as a result of functional inte-
gration, because the industries that were benetted 
from integration were government owned (Yesdau-
letova & Yesdauletov, 2012). While functionalism is 
supposed to be driven by demand from the industries 
and the “invisible hand” of the market determining 
which sectors are most beneted from integration, 
integration in the Eurasian Union has been primar-
ily government driven (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 
2012). ere has been benets in industries, but 
those industries, such as rail trac and natural gas, 
are owned by the government and therefore would 
naturally be privileged in government orchestrated 
integration. Furthermore, functionalist integration 
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takes time to naturally progress, and, as we will see, 
the Eurasian Union has been integrating too quickly 
to let functionalism run its market-driven course. It 
is clear that functionalism is not the primary driving 
factor behind the creation of the Eurasian Union. 
e transactionalist approach to regional integration 
explains the formation of the Eurasian Economic 
Union better. Transactionalism was a theory cham-
pioned by Karl W. Deutsch in an attempt to explain 
the successful integration of the European communi-
ty (Deutsch, 2014, p. 125). He claimed that integra-
tion was a long-term process that took place after sus-
tained contact with people from dierent states, in 
key areas of political involvement. His theory “con-
cluded that successful integration required a sense of 
community — a “we feeling” based on a common 
set of values” (Deutsch, 2014, p. 125). Deutsch also 
stressed the importance of transactions that political 
actors have prior to the integration project’s start. Po-
litical and business actors in Eurasia had prolonged 
contact with each other during the Soviet period. 
When the Soviet Union fell, their interactions con-
tinued and allowed for easy lines of communication 
between political boundaries, making integration ne-
gotiations easier. 
Deutsch’s idea of a “we feeling” as a prerequisite to 
successful integration has been a vital factor to the 
drive behind Eurasian integration. e historical and 
cultural community stretching across Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia has inspired the doctrine known as 
“Eurasianism” (International Crisis Group, 2016). 
Eurasianism has its roots in the Russian diaspora 
that occurred after the Bolshevik Revolution (Niemi, 
2017). Early Eurasianists, such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy 
and L.M. Gumilyov, believed there was a new Or-
thodoxical, Slavic center of civilization concentrated 
around Russia (Duncan, 2015, p. 102). Eurasian-
ism rejects the notion of Euro-centrism, and does 
not regard Greco-Roman development as the start of 
all civilization (Radzievskaya, 2014). Russia and the 
Slavic lands are not on the periphery of Europe, the 
doctrine claims, but rather are in the center of their 
own “third way” of civilizational development (In-
ternational Crisis Group, 2016, p. 7). Eurasianism 
also rejects the notion that there is a “high-culture,” 
which a culture consumed by the elites, and “low-cul-
ture” consumed by the masses (Radzievskaya, 2014, 
p. 80). Eurasianists believe that there is an accessible 
Slavic culture that stretches across a “vast unbroken 
landmass bounded on its edges by the high mountain 
ranges of the Himalayas, Caucasus and Alps, and the 
large bodies of water like Arctic, Pacic, and Atlantic 
Oceans, and the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian 
Seas” (Sevim, 2013, p. 52).
Eurasianists describe Eurasian culture as distinct from 
both the cultures of Western Europe and East Asia, 
as well as a mix of both (International Crisis Group, 
2016, p. 6). It is traditionalist and conservative, valu-
ing hard work and the family. It does not emphasize 
the importance of each individual, but rather stresses 
the importance of society as a whole. Some theorists 
also claim that Orthodoxy and Christianity is vital 
to Eurasianism, since Eurasian expansion stems back 
from the Kievan “Holy Rus,” and therefore, piety is 
considered a marker of Eurasian identity (Shkaratam, 
2015, p. 29). Some Eurasianists reject Peter the Great 
as a national icon, because they believe he pivoted 
too far toward Europe, sacricing the Russian soul 
in the process (Shkaratam, 2015, p. 30). However, 
Eurasianism also stresses the importance of econom-
ic and geographical ties with Europe, not rejecting 
the European continent completely, but acting as an 
equal partner while keeping European inuences on 
culture at a distance (Shkaratam, 2015, p. 30).
Because Eurasianism is a theory without any set 
boundaries however, it has been dicult to dene, 
resulting in diverging schools of thought. Vladimir 
Putin, for example, is considered by some scholars 
to be a “pragmatic Eurasianist,” because he has his-
torically approached a balanced policy between out-
reach to the East and the West (Sevim, 2014, p. 47). 
On the other hand, far right Eurasianists such as 
Alexander Dugin, founder of the Eurasia Party and 
advisor to Vladimir Putin, approaches Eurasianism 
from a geo-political perspective (International Crisis 
Group, 2016, p. 5). Dugin and his ideological breth-
ren, believe that the “Great Game” between major 
powers dictates Eurasia must rise to challenge the 
United States, which far right Eurasianists consider 
to be Eurasia’s chief civilizational rival. Far right Eur-
asianists further believe that the borders of Central 
Asia and Eastern Europe are articially drawn and 
do not reect the unied Eurasian civilization that 
resides in these regions, regardless of ethnic back-
ground (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 5). 
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Furthermore, there have been inconsistencies with 
using Eurasianism as the transactional basis for 
Eurasian Union integration. First, transactions be-
tween people of dierent Eurasian nations have been 
limited to the upper political and economic classes 
(Radzievskaya, 2014). Working class people, espe-
cially those engaged in agricultural industries which 
continue to make up a signicant portion of the Eur-
asian economy, have had very little contact with peo-
ples from other nations, especially in vast countries 
such as Kazakhstan and Russia (Radzievskaya, 2014). 
Furthermore, only 8% of Russians polled in 2013 
view all ethnic groups within Russia, including Ka-
zakhs, Uzbeks, Armenians, and Belarussians, equally 
(Sakwa, 2015a, p. 21). ere was a clear preference in 
the poll for European-looking Russians, which seems 
to stand in clear objection to the founding principles 
of Eurasianism. It seems that Eurasianism is a doc-
trine most easily embraced by the upper political and 
economic classes, who have had substantial interac-
tion with other Eurasian nations and stand to benet 
from political and economic integration. 
e doctrine of Eurasianism, around which the 
“we feeling” of transactional integration is centered 
around has been imposed top-down on the popula-
tions of Eurasia by being peppered into the rhetoric of 
speeches and policies of national leaders. Eurasianism 
has been at the center of Nazerbayev’s “multi-vector 
foreign policy” for Kazakhstan since he rst became 
President in 1991 (International Crisis Group, 2016, 
p. 5). Putin believes that it is the role of the Eurasian 
space to be the bridge between the East and West 
(Cheng-Hin, 2017). However, this sentiment is not 
commonly held among the people in their nations, 
whose memory of a united Eurasia is limited to the 
Soviet experience, and therefore Eurasianist has had 
to be reinforced by government policy. is is not to 
say that it is impossible for carefully crafted policy 
initiatives and cultural programs imposed top-down 
to stir Eurasianist sentiment among the people of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. However, since govern-
ment-initiated community building projects are not 
the natural progression for the creation of Deutsch’s 
“we feeling,” the Eurasian Union would have to be an 
experiment in top-down imposed identity.
Finally, we can look to the theory of neorealism in 
order to explain the drive behind integration in Eura-
sia. Many critics of the Eurasian Union Project claim 
that it is a product of geo-political, realist thinking. 
Nicolas J. Spykman, American realist thinker and 
the “godfather of containment” policy during the 
Cold War, once famously said, “Who rules Eurasia, 
controls the destinies of the world (Sevim, 2013, p. 
45).” Russia has been accused of following this logic 
through neo-imperialist methods, by using econom-
ics rather than military might to tighten connects 
between the member states of the Eurasian Union 
(Sevim, 2013, p. 45). Some have also accused Russia 
of following a neo-revisionist doctrine by undermin-
ing the liberal economic order from within in order 
to follow a realist agenda (Sakwa, 2015b, p. 163). 
Neorealism acknowledges the existence of multi-
lateral institutions such as the Eurasian Union, but 
believes that these organizations only reect current 
power dynamics and do not have an inuence on pol-
icy making. Applying this theory to the evolution of 
the Eurasian Union makes several key assumptions. 
First, it rejects the notion of Eurasianism as a genu-
ine driving force behind the integration or claims it 
is being applied “defensively,” as to avoid criticism 
of neo-imperialism (Podberezkin & Podberezkina, 
2014, p. 7). In fact, some critics dismiss the notion of 
Eurasianism in general claiming there are “no unify-
ing ideas in Eurasianism, but only geographical con-
venience with a whi of transnational imperialism” 
(Podberezkin & Podberezkina, 2014, p. 7).  Neo-
realism also assumes that Russia, as the wealthiest 
and most militarily advanced country in the Union, 
is the center of the integration project and the rest 
of the members as akin to “satellite states” (Standish, 
2015). is approach dismisses the large inuence 
of Kazakhstan in the creation and evolution of the 
EEU. However, examining the institutions and poli-
tics within the EEU will reveal the power dynamics, 
relative benets of cooperation, and may shed light 
on the theories used. 
INSTITUTIONS
e head executive and bureaucratic arm of the 
Eurasian Economic Union is the Eurasian Economic 
Commission (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 
9). e Eurasian Commission was modeled on the 
European Commission, which governs the Euro-
pean Union. e Commission was originally started 
to govern the Single Economic Space in 2012, and 
was incorporated into the governing structure of the 
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EEU with the 2014 Treaty on the EEU. e Com-
mission currently has approximately 2,000 sta 
working for it and is headquartered in Moscow, al-
though the Moscow headquarters are not meant to 
be permanent. Currently, the Commission is tasked 
with running the day to day operations with the Un-
ion, allocating budgets, solving sectoral issues, and 
upholding EEU treaties. 
At the moment, there are approximately 2,000 sta-
ers at the EEU headquarters, and it has two main 
organs: the Council of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission and the Board of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Commission (“Struktura,” 2017). e rst 
is the Council of the Eurasian Commission, which 
is composed of the Deputy-Prime Ministers from 
each members state, who share a rotating president 
between them. e Council has the primary func-
tion of approving decisions made by the Board, and 
has the power to veto decisions made by the Board. 
However, this rarely happens because decisions on 
the Council are reached by consensus. e Board of 
the Eurasian Economic Commission is made up of 
14 Ministers of the Board, three from each member 
state and two from Kyrgyzstan. Working under the 
Board of Ministers are bureaucrats from 23 func-
tional departments, such as the Department of En-
ergy and the Department Antimonopoly Regulation, 
which each Minister heads. Decisions within the 
Board of the Eurasian Commission are made based 
on Qualied Majority Voting, where each minister 
has one vote. Decisions the board makes are binding 
if they are agreed to by two-thirds of the Ministers. 
While these two bodies make decisions regarding 
day-to-day operative policies of the EEU, anything 
big or controversial gets sent up to the Council of the 
Eurasian Union. 
e Commission of the Eurasian Economic Union 
has the power to truly be a supranational institution 
(Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). With its deci-
sion making, it can move power away from federal 
governments and into the multilateral institutions. 
However, it faces some challenges. First, the Com-
mission does not have any real sanction power (In-
ternational Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). It mostly en-
forces its decisions though peer pressure and political 
leverage (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). 
Furthermore, it is dicult for the Commission to 
operate as a rules based organization because it often 
sidelined by political leaders who want to make deals 
rather than follow rules (International Crisis Group, 
2016, p. 9). erefore, an excessive amount of issues 
get bumped up to the level of the Supreme Council 
of the Eurasian Union because political leaders pri-
marily use that as a forum for negotiating acquisi-
tions and concessions. 
e Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the 
highest level organ of the Eurasian Union. It is based 
o of the European Council, where European heads 
of government meet to discuss the direction and stra-
tegic planning of the Union. e Supreme Eurasian 
Economic Council also facilitates meetings between 
the heads of government of Armenia, Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation 
(Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). e Su-
preme Council is tasked with determining the fu-
ture prospects of the EEU, including further areas 
of integration, possible new members, and current 
projects (International Crisis Group, 2016). e 
Council is also responsible for approving the budget 
and determining the contribution of member states 
(Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). However, 
while in the EU, the European Council is one of the 
many important organs of the EU, and the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council is considered the “main 
body” of the EEU (Eurasian Economic Commission, 
2015). As previously stated, the Supreme Eurasian 
Economic Council is delegated tasks from the Com-
mission and makes most of the key decisions inside 
the Eurasian Union (International Crisis Group, 
2016, p. 9). Because the Supreme Council gets heavy 
use inside the EEU, the decisions within the EEU are 
made by compromises between the heads of states. 
is robs the EEU bureaucracy of the same agency 
and inuence their EU counterparts have. 
e EEU also has a court modeled on the Europe-
an Court of Justice (ECJ) (Eurasian Economic Un-
ion, 2015). e Court of the Eurasian Union was 
originally founded in 2010 as part of the Eurasian 
Economic Community, and like the Commission, 
was incorporated into the Eurasian Union in 2015. 
e Court is composed of two judges appointed by 
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council from each 
member state, who then serve nine-year terms on the 
court. e Court has a similar mandate to the ECJ; 
it’s charged with ensuring the uniform application of 
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EEU treaties among member states. All the court’s 
rulings are, in theory, supposed to be public. 
However, the Court has gotten no use since its foun-
dation. As of 2016, the court has not been used once 
(International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). Consider-
ing the lack of news regarding court rulings, and the 
empty “summary” and “acts of the court” pages on 
the website of the Court of the Eurasian Union, it 
seems that the court has not been active in 2017 ei-
ther (Eurasian Economic Union, 2015). Private par-
ties are hesitant to use the Court of the Eurasian Un-
ion because they prefer to settle out of court and out 
of the public eye (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). e 
member states of the EEU have not used the court 
to settle disputes among each other, preferring other 
means to dispute settlements such as going through 
the head of state meetings in the Supreme Economic 
Council. 
It is also telling to see which EU institutions have 
not been adopted into the framework of the EEU. 
e EEU has no parliament, meaning it has no di-
rectly elected body.  Russia has been at the forefront 
of calling for the creation of a EEU parliament as one 
of the legislative institutions of the EEU (Maloof, 
2012). Putin is reportedly pushing “full speed ahead” 
in preliminary negotiations for the creation of such 
a body (Maloof, 2012). However, Russia is receiving 
pushback from Kazakhstan and Belarus who believe 
that the creation of a parliament is “premature” and 
do not foresee the creation of a directly elected body 
in the foreseeable future. It should be noted that if 
the EEU parliament adopted the EU Parliament’s 
proportional representation model, the Russian Fed-
eration would retain the most seats out of all EEU 
member states. It should further be noted, however, 
that the EU Parliament is considered to be the most 
supranational body of the EU, bypassing the federal 
governments of the EU member states entirely with 
direct elections (McCormick & Olsen, 2011, p. 29). 
ough Russia might be hoping to capitalize on their 
large population in order to control an EEU institu-
tion, their push for supranational is noteworthy.
e EEU also does not have a common currency, 
unlike the Eurozone within the EU which does. De-
spite the fallout from the Eurozone crisis, plans for 
creating a new Eurasian common currency are pro-
jected to be completed by 2025 (Sudakov, 2014). 
ere are proposals for the currency to be called the 
“altyn” after the currency that was used at the time 
Golden Horde, the Mongol Empire that controlled 
vast swaths of Eurasia (Sudakov, 2014). e imagery 
evoked on currency is symbolic of the culture that 
uses the currency. e European Union, for exam-
ple, has banknotes highlighting European architec-
ture from throughout the continent. e fact that 
the proposed currency is named after the Mongol 
Empire, as opposed to something reminiscent of the 
Kievan Rus for example, can be indicative of the de-
nition of Eurasia lying closer to the heart of nomadic 
culture, as opposed to a more Western orientation. 
However, the name of the currency has not been set 
in stone. Some proposals had the currency called the 
“Yevraz,” after the Slavic pronunciation of “Eurasia” 
as “Yevrazia” (e Moscow Times, 2015). Whatever 
name the Eurasian Union chooses will not only re-
ect economic unity, but will also further reect on 
the denition of Eurasianism. President Nazarbayev 
believes that one day, the currency, regardless of what 
it’s called, will one day enter into the world as a re-
serve currency, further bolstering the power of the 
Eurasian region (Sudakov, 2014). 
By examining the institutions created, and not cre-
ated, by the Eurasian Union, one sees both neoliberal 
and realist inuence. Missing, so far, is the transac-
tional inuence that would have united the region 
under Eurasianism. Depending on how the mon-
etary union project progresses, Eurasianism could 
manifest itself in both the use and the design of the 
common currency. ere have been some neoliberal 
institutionalist progressions made in the formation 
of the Eurasian Economic Commission, which seems 
to have an infrastructure that is capable of dealing 
with sectoral issues. However, the accusations of real-
ist power politics manifest themselves in the activity 
of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, which 
bypasses the Commission’s bureaucratic structures 
and allow for federal politics to manifest themselves 
in the multilateral organization. However, the real-
ist assumption that the Eurasian Economic Union is 
simply run by the Russian Federation is undercut by 
the failure of the Russian Federation to push through 
their agenda to create a Parliament. erefore, with 
signicant reform to overcome obvious shortcom-
ings, the Eurasian European Union has the institu-
tional capacity to be an eective organization. is, 
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however, would require deep commitment from its 
leaders to further increase the EEU’s viability. 
FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS 
At the moment, the Eurasian Union is surrounded 
on both sides by global powers. On the west, the Eu-
ropean Union and the Eurasian Union are engaged 
in a “normative rivalry,” in which they compete for 
inuence in a rules based regime (Dragneva & Wolc-
zuk, 2015). On the east is the rising power of China, 
which also has initiatives and ambitions in Eurasia 
(Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). Ideally, the Eur-
asian Union is looking to keep a balance of power 
among the three, remaining within the cooperative 
nature of multilateral institutions. However, because 
both the European Union, the Eurasian Union, and 
China hope to expand their inuence, they often 
nd themselves in competition with each other. 
China is a rising power that is starting to look to the 
Eurasian region as a partner, and sometimes, rival for 
expansionist inuence (Cheng-Hin, 2016). Today, 
China is the EEU’s largest trading partner and has 
strong bilateral relations with individual members 
of the Union. Kazakhstan and China have just suc-
cessfully completed a massive rail project that now 
connects the two countries. China has also given Be-
larus 5.5 billion USD in loans and conducts approxi-
mately 4 billion USD in trade with Belarus annu-
ally. Russia and China have collaborated on the New 
Development Bank made up of the BRICS countries 
of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
Cooperation has been so strong that China and the 
EEU are now in talks to create a free trade zone in 
the near future. 
However, it is unlikely that China would ever be-
come incorporated into the EEU (Glazyev & Tka-
chuk, 2015, p. 81). Fundamentally, China is a com-
petitor in the Central Asian space for inuence. 
China is planning on creating the “Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt,” a trade and cultural exchange initiative 
that is meant to develop infrastructure and bi-lateral 
relations between nations along the path of the Silk 
Road and China. China has planned investment into 
cities along Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and along the 
Middle East, to the Caspian Sea. Because the initia-
tive is still new, and the EEU has not entered into any 
formal talks of association with candidate countries 
that could potentially receive Chinese investment 
funds, the partnership between the EEU and China 
has been amicable. However, as both entities seek to 
expand their inuence, the positive relationship may 
not last. 
e relationship between the EU and the EEU has 
been far more tense. In Putin’s speech announcing 
the intention to create the EEU, he claimed it would 
be a partner to the EU (Putin, 2011). Proponents 
of the project claim that the EEU is complemen-
tary, not rival to the EU (Dzarasov, 2015, p. 125). 
However, in practice the EU and the EEU have been 
clashing in the shared neighborhood of Eastern Eu-
rope (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 6). e Euro-
pean Union is facing its own crisis with a ood of 
migrants, uneven economic development, and the 
rise of far right parties (Dragneva-Lewers & Wol-
czuk, 2015). However, Europe still is more attrac-
tive with potential candidate countries than Russia 
(Seten, 2015). To combat this, the EEU has created a 
normative framework that is more appealing to East-
ern Europeans than the EU’s framework in order to 
gain further partners and candidates (Seten, 2015).
One of the sources of tension between the EU and 
the EEU is the proliferation of EU Association 
Agreements (Sala, 2015, p. 165). Inside the EU these 
agreements are viewed as declarations of friendship, 
as well as armations that a state might eventually 
join the EU (Sala, 2015, p. 167). However, there 
have been some states who have signed the Associa-
tion Agreements that have been consistently rejected 
in their applications for membership. Turkey has had 
an Association Agreement with the EU since 1963 
and is currently in its fth decade of waiting for EU 
membership approval (Onis, 2004). Dutch voters re-
cently held a non-binding referendum, rejecting the 
opening of any negotiation chapters that would al-
low for the eventual membership of Ukraine, which 
signed the Association Agreement in 2014 (Drag-
neva & Wolczuk, 2015). e EU requires countries 
wishing to sign an Association Agreement to reform 
their government and economic systems, engaging 
in democratization and aligning itself closer with the 
rules of the EU, without allowing the associate mem-
bers much say in the process (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 
2015). Furthermore, the EU requires that Associate 
Members do not participate in any other regional 
trading blocs, preventing Eastern European countries 
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from becoming observer states in the EEU while also 
seeing associate EU membership (Dragneva & Wol-
czuk, 2015).
To combat this, the EEU has created a framework 
that would make it easier to states to join without 
conducting much internal reform. e EEU does 
not allow for Association Agreements, but does 
grant countries observer status in the bloc (Morgan, 
2017). It also does not explicitly prohibit its mem-
bers from signing Association Agreements with the 
EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). In the EU, a set 
of criteria labeled the “Copenhagen Criteria,” out-
line democratic standards that countries have to meet 
before they can ascend to membership (McCormick 
& Olsen, 2011, p. 81). e Eurasian Union has no 
such criteria and only requires that a country be able 
to take on the full set of agreements that were already 
adopted by the Eurasian Union  (Dragneva & Wolc-
zuk, 2015, p. 9). Finally, the EEU is willing to oer 
small countries a seat at the table of negotiation and 
a more equal status than they would have received in 
the EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). is ap-
proach seems to have a degree of appeal. Moldova, a 
country once thought to be rmly on the side of Eu-
rope, has now applied for and was granted observer 
state status in the EEU on April 18, 2017 (Morgan, 
2017). ough the country still claims that it will 
maintain the viability of their EU Association Agree-
ment, it was noted that Ukraine was forced to give 
up observer status in the EEU in order to be granted 
EU associate membership (Petro, 2013). It is now up 
the EU to decide how they will react to Moldova’s 
observer status. However, one fears that escalation 
of this dispute to the level of the Ukrainian conict, 
which revealed some of the weaknesses in the unity 
and the governing framework of the EEU. 
CRITICISMS AND CRISES 
ough the EEU has made some strides toward pro-
gress, it is severely hampered by its lack of institu-
tional capacity. is has severely weakened both the 
ability of the EEU to implement some of its more 
ambitious policies, as well as respond to crises. As 
stated before, integration was very rapid. ough 
this allowed for the countries within the Union so 
solidify their denition of Eurasia, and enter into a 
normative rivalry with the EU, it didn’t allow for a 
natural evolution that would have allowed for more 
eective governance. First, it prevented policymakers 
from examining the benets and drawbacks of the 
previous form of integration before moving onto the 
next one (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012, p. 8). 
Second, it rushed the creation and evolution of the 
Eurasian Commission, preventing the formation of a 
robust and egalitarian bureaucracy that would have 
allowed for more supranational and equality among 
EEU members.
While the EU was allowed to functionally integrate 
from the European Coal and Steel Community to 
the European Economic Community, and eventually 
to the European Union, the EEU did not have that 
benet. e transactional ties formed over natural gas 
and oil partnerships could have been a solid founda-
tion for a hypothetical Eurasian Natural Gas and Oil 
Community, however, it was not enough to form ties 
over many various industries. Within the EEU, there 
are simply “too many economic sectors requiring too 
many regulations” and not enough time to determine 
the best course of regulation for them all (Yesdaule-
tova & Yesdauletov, 2012, p. 10). ere have been 
benets to some industries that were mostly owned 
by the state, such as transport and heavy engineering 
rms, but overall growth has slowed down (Standish, 
2015). Seeing stagnation this early in the develop-
ment of an integration project could spell trouble for 
the future unless reforms are pursued. 
e rapid speed of integration has also prevented the 
creation of the robust institutions that are required 
to x these problems. e Eurasian Commission has 
the sta and structure capable to work on ameliorat-
ing issues that come with rapid integration. However, 
the overwhelming focus on state sovereignty within 
the EEU has weakened the Commission and given 
most of the power to the Supreme Eurasian Eco-
nomic Council. ough the Commission is a rules-
based organization capable of decision making, deci-
sion making is not at the core of the former Soviet 
space (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). Instead, 
decisions are delegated to the highest level possible, 
which in this case, is to the heads of state (Dragneva 
& Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). is limits decision mak-
ing to top-down deal making, at the highest level of 
governance. 
Delegating all decisions to the highest possible au-
thority can further create mistrust and suspicion be-
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tween states (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Momynku-
lov, 2013, p. 476). Some Kazakhs feel that they have 
lost out on key decision making processes within the 
EEU and guard their sovereignty cautiously (Yes-
bayeva, Delovarova, & Momynkulov, 2013, p. 477). 
Some argue that national interest should always take 
priority over integration because they fear a return 
to the Soviet days (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Mo-
mynkulov, 2013, p. 477). Worse, some fear that Rus-
sia will attempt to annex some of the Russian ethnic 
majority areas in Northern Kazakhstan, just like Rus-
sia annexed Crimea (“Introducing the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union,” 2014). ese fears force Kazakhstan’s 
leaders to stall on political integration and ensure that 
the EEU stays purely economic, halting projects like 
the Eurasian Parliament (“Introducing the Eurasian 
Economic Union,” 2014). Because the bureaucratic 
and institutional structure of the Eurasian Union 
is weak, power politics and realist fears are allowed 
to ourish. It is clear that on a Council where the 
heads of state are the only members, Putin, the most 
powerful man in the world according to Forbes (“e 
world’s most powerful people 2016,” 2016), would 
reign supreme. However, if the bureaucracy played 
a more important role in decision making, then the 
Kazakhs (and Byelorussians and Armenians), who 
are well-represented in the Councils and Boards of 
the Commission, would no longer feel like they are 
losing out on key decisions. 
ese institutional setbacks harm the way that the 
EEU is able to respond to crises (Petro, 2013). No 
discussion of the EEU is complete with analyzing the 
setbacks it faced in the lead up and the aftermath of 
the Ukraine crisis. Ukraine’s ousted President Yanu-
kovych was weighing the costs and benets of joining 
either the Eurasian Customs Union or signing an As-
sociation Agreement with the European Union when 
the crisis took place. Yanukovych abruptly pulled out 
the EU negotiations in favor of a deal closer to Russia 
and the Eurasian Union.
 Supporters of this plan oered similar incentives to 
the ones mentioned before. Ukraine, EEU propo-
nents argued, “should be the cradle of Eastern Euro-
pean civilizations, not on the outskirts of other Euro-
pean powers” (Fesenko, 2015, p. 126). Some Russian 
economists claimed that “the invisible hand of the 
market” guides Ukraine toward Russia and Ukraine 
would be better o as a member of the EEU than 
with an EU Association Agreement. e Ukrainian 
shipbuilding, aircraft, and mechanical engineering 
industries, economists claimed, would all benet 
signicantly within a decade of joining the Union 
(Seten, 2015). Furthermore, supporters of Ukraine’s 
pivot to the EEU said that the EU wasn’t oering 
Ukraine membership, and that Ukraine would have 
signicantly more political power in the institutions 
of the EEU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012, p. 13). 
Critics of the EEU pivot claim that even under the 
pro-Russian Yanukovych, Ukraine never made clear 
commitments to join the EEU and only wanted par-
tial membership at best (Dragneva-Lewers, Rilka, & 
Wolczuk, 2015).
However, the abrupt shift away from the European 
Union angered the Ukrainian population and the 
move prompted the Euromaidan protests that oust-
ed Yanukovych and caused Russia to annex Crimea 
(Fesenko, 2015). is resulted in Russia annexing 
Crimea in order to protect their interests on the pen-
insula, which resulting in the EU levying heavy sanc-
tions against Russia. Russia’s response in turn was to 
create sanctions against the European Union. In the 
fallout, “the Kremlin hasn’t streamlined its political 
incentives with its economic partners,” leading to an 
inability to coordinate successfully retaliatory sanc-
tions (Seten, 2015). Russia had to reinstate border 
and customs controls in 2014 on the Russian-Byelo-
russian border because Russia was accusing Belarus 
of allowing European goods to ow into Russia by 
mislabeling them as Byelorussian (Niemi, 2016). Ka-
zakhstan has refused to end business and trade with 
the European Union, despite Russian requests to do 
so (Furman & Libman, 2015). e EEU has been 
entirely unhelpful in resolving trade related disputes 
stemming from the Ukraine crisis, because it has not 
had the institutional capacity to do so. Since most 
of the controversial decisions were delegated to the 
heads of state, national interests took precedence 
over any issue, hampering any dispute settling func-
tion the EEU could have had.
What is possibly more concerning is the fact that 
the EEU institutions are incapable of overcoming 
sovereign conicts that prevent eective implemen-
tation of existing policies. An example of institu-
tional decit is evidenced by the restrictions placed 
on the free movement objective of the EEU. Putin 
openly praised the Schengen Area within the EU for 
12
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facilitating free movement of labor between coun-
tries (Putin, 2011). He and the EEU leaders hoped 
to create the area within the EEU. Free movement 
of labor within the EEU would benet Russia, since 
it is the second largest importer of labor, after the 
United States and has an aging population similar to 
that of Europe (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). 
Furthermore, the labor exporting Central Asian re-
publics, as well as some countries in Eastern Europe, 
would be able to prot on remittances and ensure 
safer, easier passage of their population to and from 
the Russian Federation (Yesdauletova & Yesdaule-
tov, 2012). For these reasons, border controls were 
eliminated in 2011 in order to facilitate better free 
movement of labor between the countries of the Eur-
asian Economic Community (Radzievskaya, 2014). 
“Free movement” became one of the core objectives 
of the Eurasian Economic Union, embedded into its 
founding treaty (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017). How-
ever, the agreement on free movement has not been 
applied practically, and therefore remains mostly de-
clarative (Radzievskaya, 2014). On paper, any citizen 
of any of the EEU member states can live and work 
in any other EEU member state. However, those at-
tempting to do so will be faced with domestic bu-
reaucratic restrictions that make it very dicult to 
move to a new county, much less a new country. 
Many of the problems regarding free movement 
arise from strict and arcane registration systems that 
began in the Russian Empire after the liberation of 
the serfs (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). In order to 
prevent mass migration of peasants to urban centers 
and prevent the creation of slums, the Imperial Rus-
sian government created a registration system, called 
the “propiska” system, that tied someone’s ability to 
receive social services based on their permanent place 
of residence (Schenk, 2015). It was dicult and ex-
pensive to change one’s registration, especially if one 
wished to move from the countryside to the city. e 
USSR kept this policy in order to control popula-
tion ows and ensure the viability of collective farms 
(Schenk, 2015). After the fall of the USSR, Belarus, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia chose to keep their registry 
systems in order to continue maintaining control 
over population ow (Schenk, 2015). erefore, a 
Kazakh national who chooses to live and work in St. 
Petersburg must go through a bureaucratically di-
cult, and expensive place of registry process, or risk 
not having access to education, healthcare, and legal 
employment services (“Russian ombudsman,” 2007).
e EEU has not addressed these registration sys-
tems in their negotiations over free movement. It is 
within the national interests of Russia, Belarus, and 
Kyrgyzstan to keep their registry systems because it 
collects revenue from registry permit fees and allows 
government intervention into movement within 
their own countries. Because of the focus on sover-
eignty within the EEU, national interests are allowed 
to reign supreme over the interests of the trading 
bloc. erefore, even a fundamental tenet like free 
movement of labor across borders, that might be mu-
tually benecial to all parties involved, is subject to 
restriction at the domestic level. 
PROSPECTS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
At the moment the EEU has massive potential to 
be a successful trading bloc and integration project 
(Niemi, 2016). ere are multiple positive prospects 
that currently exist within the EEU. For example, 
the Eurasian Economic Commission has the sta 
framework present within its numerous, specic de-
partments to solve trade-related problems. e EEU 
treaty specically doesn’t allow for states to have res-
ervations to EEU agreements, so states cannot “opt 
out” of measures that the EEU creates (Dragneva & 
Wolczuk, 2015). is is a big step toward creating 
a rules-based multilateral regime. Furthermore, the 
EEU is currently working with the WTO in order to 
remove protectionist measures and receive the same 
voting rights within the WTO as the EU has (Drag-
neva & Wolczuk, 2012). is shows that progress is 
possible within the framework of the EEU. 
But in order for the EEU to continue move beyond 
its current stage and provide maximal prosperity for 
all its members, it needs to move away from geopoli-
tics and focus on governance (International Crisis 
Group, 2016, p. 22). Geopolitics simply breeds re-
alist fears about hostile takeovers and unequal part-
nerships, which does not bode well for collabora-
tion. In order for the EEU to reach its potential, the 
leaders of the Union must commit to neoliberalism 
and strengthen the institutions in which they have 
invested. Of course, hints of power politics will al-
ways be embedded into the project, but leaders must 
13
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recognize it is in everyone’s best interests if decision 
making mechanisms were strengthened and issues of 
inequality were resolved. 
e European Economic Commission must be made 
stronger and be reformed to give it the capacity and 
political clout to tackle non-tari barriers and pro-
tectionism within the Union (International Crisis 
Group, 2016, p. 22). Issues should not be simply 
delegated up to the Supreme Council, but dealt with 
along the channels that were created for its purpose. 
is will increase the eciency and prosperity of the 
EEU because the Commission is staed with experts 
in economics and trade specically, and would be 
able to craft eective policy. e Court of the Eura-
sian Union must also be put to use for both private 
parties and states wishing to settle disputes (Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2016, p. 22). Finally, the Union 
should orient itself to deal further with problems of 
social welfare and standard of living across the Un-
ion, along with xing the broken migration and free 
movement architecture (International Crisis Group, 
2016, p. 22). Improved social wellbeing as a result 
of the Union will mobilize the masses in support of 
the EEU in an organic manner which the doctrine 
of Eurasianism has failed to do among the populace 
(Sakwa, 2015b, p. 167). Improving migration and 
free movement architecture and allowing it to go into 
practice will also benet the Union, as it will attract 
smaller countries who wish to benet from the Rus-
sian labor import market (Schenk, 2015).
Until structural reforms happen, it would be wise to 
pace integration. Before the monetary union, which 
would be in eect once a common currency is es-
tablished, is created, results from the common mar-
ket should be measured. Before the results from the 
common market could be measured, the common 
market needs to function properly. e tenets of the 
common market should be fullled before the next 
step of deeper integration is pursued. erefore, un-
til proper institutional reform is implemented which 
allows the original goals that drove integration to be 
realized, the EEU should not pursue a monetary un-
ion. ough the timeline of EEU integration does 
not have to exactly follow the timeline of the EU, 
EEU leaders should keep in mind how long it took 
for the EU to create the institutions that it currently 
functions under. 
 However, in regards to horizontal expansion, and 
adding the new members, the EEU needs to actively 
continue seeking possible applicants. Because its nor-
mative rivalry with the EU and the potential threat 
of a rivalry with China, the Eurasian space must 
be a competitive one. In order to do this, the EEU 
must capitalize on what makes it a unique project 
and dierent from the EU and China’s potential Silk 
Road Initiative. e framework for the EEU already 
is in place, putting it in a normative advantage over 
China’s stalled Silk Road project. Furthermore, the 
EEU must exploit its focus on sovereignty and lack 
of democratic requirements. is can make it an at-
tractive project to new or incomplete democracies 
whose leaders are not willing to commit resources 
and political risk to “Europeanizing” their govern-
ments. From a non-Western perspective, the idea of a 
multilateral institutions that does not interfere with 
domestic politics can be very attractive. e EEU has 
great potential with countries such as Iran, Azerbai-
jan, and Uzbekistan. ese countries, which would 
never have even been considered as European Union 
members present an opportunity for enlargement 
and political allies in Asia. 
Turkey also presents a potential opportunity for 
EEU expansion. Once thought to be rmly a can-
didate for EU membership, Turkey has veered away 
from the liberal democratic principles of the EU and 
is charting its path closer to the partial democracies 
of the EEU (Kirisci, 2016). Turkey signed the As-
sociation Agreement with the European Community 
in 1963, and has since applied for membership twice 
and been rejected (Redmond, 2007, pp. 305-317). 
It seems that the Turkish public is becoming less en-
chanted with the EU with favorability ratings of the 
EU among Turks falling (Dagdeverenis, 2004). e 
Turkish government is also turning away from Eu-
rope. President Erdogan has used the summer 2016 
coup attempt to crack down on political dissent 
and consolidate his power, despite various condem-
nations of his actions by EU governments (Kirisci, 
2016). Furthermore, the European Parliament has 
voted to suspend all further accession negotiations 
with Turkey, making Turkish membership in the EU 
unlikely in the near future (Kanter, 2016).
is is the ideal space for the EEU to move in and at-
tempt to forge ties with Turkey. Turkey and Kazakh-
stan already have longstanding relations, collaborat-
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ing on oil and natural gas pipelines (Nurgaliyeva, 
2016). ese oil and gas collaborations could serve as 
the basis for further negotiations, as they had in the 
rest of the EEU. In 2014, Turkey even began work-
ing on establishing a free trade area with the Eura-
sian Economic Community. However, negotiations 
stalled when Turkey shot down a Russian ghter 
plane, heading to Syria, leading to tense relations 
between the two countries in 2015 (Genc, 2016). 
Today, however, relations between Turkey and Rus-
sia have “normalized,” and might have strengthened 
after the Russian Ambassador to Turkey was shot by 
an ISIS operative, bringing the two countries togeth-
er in their aims of ghting Islamic terrorism (Genc, 
2016). 
Some Turkish scholars have embraced the concept 
of Eurasianism and have started turning away from 
Europe (Tanrisever, 2015). Turks are starting to look 
to the Turkic communities in Central Asia to histori-
cally and culturally bind them to the rest of the Eura-
sian nations (Tanrisever, 2015). However, in order to 
fully embrace Turkey into the Eurasian community, 
Eurasianism must be redened. Some scholars view 
Christian Orthodoxy as essential to the Eurasian 
identity, a qualication that stands at odds with the 
Muslim population of Turkey (Radzievskaya, 2014). 
If the Eurasian Union embraces a denition of Eura-
sianism free from religious constraints however, us-
ing the social welfare focus to gain popular support 
among citizens rather than an appeal to religious 
fervor, they have much to gain. Turkish membership 
would be a victory in the “normative rivalry” between 
the EEU and the EU. Turkey would be the second 
largest economy in the bloc and act as a balancer to 
Russia’s power, ensuring that it would be dicult for 
one nation to dominate the bloc (Nurgaliyeva, 2016). 
Furthermore, Turkey’s strategic location would pro-
vide the EEU with access to the Mediterranean and 
a gateway to the rest of the Middle East. e current 
government in Turkey might also be incentivized by 
the lack of democratic requirements to join the EEU, 
allowing the Turkish government to continue to pur-
sue its current path of power centralization. If the 
EEU pursues, and successfully convinces Turkey to 
accept Europe’s rejection and join the Eurasian bloc, 
it would be a great victory for the EEU.
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER 
QUESTIONS
e world is being divided into areas governed by dif-
ferent sets of norms that will either collaborate or ri-
val each other (Lukyamov, 2015). e ability to per-
suade other nations to adopt a particular set of norms 
is becoming the new test for the inuence a nation 
has in the international system (Lukyamov, 2015). 
e EEU will be a test of Russia’s ability to create 
an organization that is attractive to other nations, 
led by a “third way,” Eurasian set of rules and norms 
that stresses economic cooperation, while maintain-
ing sovereignty and disregarding democratic devel-
opment. Creating this attractive institution requires 
both a focus on building a Eurasian community and 
building the viable institutions that would be able to 
facilitate economic prosperity. 
e focus on building and solidifying the borders of 
a “Eurasian” community was a major driving force 
in the creation of the EEU. However, the rapid pace 
of integration that resulted from this transactional 
drive came at the expensive of viable and function-
ing institutions. e lack of a single case presented to 
the Court of the Eurasian Union shows that the rules 
based regime that Putin, Nazerbayev, and Lukashen-
ko were attempting to create needs work. Because of 
the lack of institutional framework, power politics 
are allowed to ourish, reviving old Soviet-era fears 
about the dominance of Moscow. However, if a com-
mitment to liberal institutionalist reforms that prior-
itize rules based decision making over striking politi-
cal deals are made, the EEU has a chance to ourish.
e EEU has potential for growth, but needs solid 
institutions in order to compete with its normative 
rival the EU and the growing power of China. How-
ever, that would be very dicult if the EEU cannot 
manage its own crises or even fully implement a core 
agenda, such as free movement. Reform requires 
commitment from the leaders of the countries in-
volved. But, if they realize the type of potential the 
EEU can have in the international system, even the 
leaders of these authoritarian-leaning countries can 
act in a collective best interest and improve the insti-
tutions of the EEU.
For future study, the most pertinent question rising 
out of this analysis is why exactly the staers at the 
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Eurasian Economic Commission delegate so much 
responsibility up the level of the Supreme Economic 
Council? Were they instructed to do so by their su-
periors? Is economics considered “high politics” in 
post-Soviet regimes, and therefore only heads of state 
are allowed to make nal decisions on it? Or is there 
simply self-censorship in the ranks of the Commis-
sion, when they fear retribution if they act too de-
cisively on a core matter? Currently, no literature on 
this exists and learning more about the inside mecha-
nisms of the Commission and the Council and the 
project would be a massive undertaking. However, 
understanding the internal decision making struc-
tures of these organizations would allow for the crea-
tion of better modalities to ameliorate problems of 
ineectiveness and inequality. 
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